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NOTES
MORAN v. BURBINE: THE DECLINE OF
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S "VITAL" ROLE IN
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM
The fifth,' sixth,2 and fourteenth3 amendments to the United States Con-
stitution form a core of individual liberties that is fundamental to the fair
administration of our accusatorial system of justice.4 When an individual
becomes the focus of a criminal investigation, these individual rights are
sometimes threatened by our law enforcement system.5 While zealously at-
tempting to apprehend and convict those individuals who violate the law,
the government may ignore restraints imposed by the Constitution upon
state criminal procedures.6 Historically, this has most often occurred when
the police have attempted to secure a confession from a suspect through
1. The fifth amendment privilege guarantees that an individual will not be compelled to
incriminate himself. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457-60 (1966). The fifth amendment
states in relevant part: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself .. " U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment was made applicable to
the states through the fourteenth amendment in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
2. The sixth amendment ensures that an accused will not be deprived of life or liberty
during a criminal prosecution unless he is given an opportunity to have the assistance of coun-
sel for his defense. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938). The sixth amendment
states in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amend-
ment was made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment in Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3. The fourteenth amendment due process clause guarantees fundamental fairness
throughout the entire course of proceedings against an accused. See Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 169 (1952). The fourteenth amendment states in relevant part: "No State shall ...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. Due process is protected against federal intrusion by the fifth amendment.
See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942), overruled on other grounds, Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
4. See generally F. GRAHAM, THE DUE PROCESS REVOLUTION: THE WARREN
COURT'S IMPACT ON CRIMINAL. LAW 159-60 (1970) (discussing the distinction between accu-
satorial and inquisitional systems of justice).
5. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 481; see also Constantino, Cannavo & Goldstein, A New
Wave of Sixth Amendment Waivers: The Use of Judicial Officers as Advisors, 49 FORI)HAM L.
REV. 329, 329 (1980).
6. See Constantino, Cannavo & Goldstein, supra note 5, at 329.
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questionable interrogation tactics.7 Thus, the judiciary has frequently been
called upon to strike a balance between society's competing interests in the
protection of individual liberties and the maintenance of effective law en-
forcement through custodial interrogation.8
In striking this balance in the past, the Supreme Court of the United
States has stated that an accusatorial system of justice is not swayed by
"fear" that a suspect will exercise the rights guaranteed to him under the
federal Constitution.9 Hence, although the entrance of an attorney into the
early stages of a criminal investigation will usually promote a suspect's invo-
cation of rights,'" the Court has emphasized that defense counsel should not
be considered "a menace to law enforcement. ' ' "t Instead, the attorney has
been recognized by the Court as playing "a vital role" 2 and occupying "a
critical position" 3 in our criminal justice system. In 1986, however, the
Court retreated from this philosophy in Moran v. Burbine, " a decision that
has seriously threatened defense counsels' ability to provide clients with
meaningful legal assistance prior to and during custodial interrogation."
In Burbine, assistant public defender Allegra Munson telephoned the
Cranston, Rhode Island police station at 8:15 p.m. on the evening of Brian
Burbine's arrest in connection with a burglary investigation.' 6 An unidenti-
7. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445-58.
8. See Comment, An Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police Interro-
gation, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1048-51 (1964) [hereinafter Historical Argument].
9. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
10. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 480 ("An attorney may advise his client not to talk to police
... or he may wish to be present with his client during any police questioning. In doing so an
attorney is merely exercising the good professional judgment he has been taught.").
11. See id.
12. Id. at 481.
13. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979).
14. 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986).
15. One commentator reported on the prospective implications of Burbine as viewed by
pro-defense groups such as the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, tfie Na-
tional Legal Aid and Defender Association and the American Civil Liberties Union. See
Browning, Moran v. Burbine: The Magic of Miranda, 72 A.B.A. J., Jan. 1, 1986, at 58-59
(Burbine's lawyers and their amici "fear that ... the police will be encouraged to treat defense
attorneys as interlopers."); see also Brief for American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae at 4,
Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986) (No. 84-1485) ("The ABA is deeply concerned that,
if the police may constitutionally prevent any communication between a lawyer and an indi-
vidual held in isolation, an important right to legal representation will be lost."). See generally
Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah and Miranda: What Is "Interrogation "? When Does It
Matter 67 GEo. L.J. 1, 93-94 (1978).
16. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1138-39 (1986). Burbine's sister had contacted the public de-
fenders office to obtain legal representation for her brother in the breaking and entering charge.
Id. at 1139. When assistant public defender Richard Casparian, who was representing Burbine
in an unrelated charge, could not be reached, Munson was assigned to the case. Id.
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fled male in the station's detective division answered the call. 7 Munson
identified herself and asked if Burbine was being held in custody. 8 After
receiving an affirmative response, Munson stated that she would represent
Burbine if the police planned to question him or place him in a lineup.' 9
Munson was informed that the police were "through" with Burbine for the
night and would not be questioning him.2" Munson was not told that in
addition to being implicated in the pending breaking and entering charge,
Burbine was also the principal suspect in the investigation of a murder that
had occurred several months earlier in Providence, Rhode Island.2' The
police also failed to tell Munson that members of the Providence police force
had been summoned to Cranston for the purpose of interrogating Burbine
about the murder.22 Less than an hour after Munson's telephone call to the
Cranston police station, Burbine was interrogated without being informed of
Munson's inquiry in his behalf.23 After the police administered Miranda
warnings,24 Burbine executed several written waivers and fully confessed to
17. Id. (citing State v. Burbine, 451 A.2d 22, 23-24 (R.I. 1982)).
18. Id. (citing State v. Burbine, 451 A.2d at 23-24).
19. Id. (citing State v. Burbine, 451 A.2d at 23-24).
20. Id. (citing State v. Burbine, 451 A.2d at 23-24). The following facts regarding the
telephone conversation were also asserted at trial and during a suppression hearing: Munson
did not ask to speak with Burbine; she did not give the police any instructions or ask them to
relay a message to her client; she did not inquire about the pending charges against Burbine;
she did not ask for the name of the person who answered her telephone call; and, Munson did
not provide information about where she could be reached that evening should the police have
needed to contact her. Brief of Petitioner at 6-7, Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986)
(No. 84-1485). At trial, Munson stated that she did not "think it was appropriate to give
information to a client on the telephone when they didn't know you and you didn't know
them." Id. at 7. On the morning following the telephone call, Munson prepared a memoran-
dum to verify the incident. Id. Counsel did not appear on Burbine's behalf until summoned
by the police later in the afternoon when Burbine was placed in a lineup. Id.
21. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1139 (citing State v. Burbine, 451 A.2d at 23-24). Prior to
Burbine's arrest, Detective Ferranti of the Cranston police received information that impli-
cated Burbine in the murder of Mary Jo Hickey. Id. at 113 8. Hickey had been found uncon-
scious in a parking lot in Providence several months earlier and died from skull injuries
inflicted with a metal pipe. Id.
22. Id. at 1139 (citing State v. Burbine, 451 A.2d at 23-24). After Ferranti's suspicion
about Burbine's involvement in the Hickey murder was substantiated, he telephoned the Provi-
dence police to inform them of Burbine's apprehension in Cranston. Id. at 1138. Three Provi-
dence police officers were immediately dispatched to the Cranston police station to question
Burbine. Id. at 1138-39.
23. Id. at 1139.
24. The Miranda warnings, which have become a familiar institution since they were de-
lineated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), require that, prior to custodial interroga-
tion, an individual must be informed that:
he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a
court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he
1986]
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the murder.25
Prior to trial, Burbine asserted that his waiver was not valid and moved to
have his statements suppressed from evidence. 26 Finding "no ... collusion
or conspiracy on the part of the police 'to secrete [Burbine] from his attor-
ney,' ,21 the Superior Court of Rhode Island denied the motion.28 After
being convicted of first-degree murder,29 Burbine appealed to the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island. 30 The court upheld the trial judge's finding that
Burbine had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to
counsel and affirmed the conviction."1 Burbine's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus was denied by the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Rhode Island.3 2 He then appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit. 3  The First Circuit reversed, holding that the
combined circumstances of the police "reckless[ly]" misleading Munson and
then failing to communicate the exchange to Burbine vitiated any possibility
of a valid waiver.
34
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in a six to three decision, re-
versed the court of appeals. 3 5 Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor
rejected Burbine's constitutional arguments and held that his confession was
properly admitted into evidence,3 6 even though the police misinformed
Munson about their plans to interrogate her client 37 and failed to inform
Burbine of his lawyer's efforts to reach him.38 Justice Stevens, joined by
Justices Brennan and Marshall in a dissenting opinion, countered that the
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he
so desires.
Id. at 479.
25. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1139. Burbine was questioned during a series of interrogations.
Id. Prior to each session, he was informed of his Miranda rights. Id. He executed three
written waivers, acknowledging that he comprehended his right to the presence of counsel
during the interrogation, and explicitly declined to exercise the right to counsel. Id. Burbine
also had access to a telephone at least twice during the evening of the interrogation. Id.
26. State v. Burbine, 451 A.2d at 22.
27. Id. at 24.
28. Id. at 22.
29. Id. Burbine was sentenced to life imprisonment. Id.
30. Id. at 22.
31. Id. at 31.
32. Burbine v. Moran, 589 F. Supp. 1245 (D.R.I. 1984). The district court held that
under the totality of circumstances, Burbine's waiver was made "sentiently, intelligently, and
in the free exercise of volitional judgment." Id. at 1253.
33. Burbine v. Moran, 753 F.2d 178 (1st Cir. 1985).
34. Id. at 187.
35. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1148.
36. Id. at 1145, 1147-48.
37. See id. at 1140, 1143.
38. See id. at 1140, 1142-43. Although the Court phrased the issue as if Munson at-
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Decline of Defense Counsel's "Vital" Role
majority opinion was as equally offensive to "well-established legal princi-
ples" as the conduct of the Cranston police.39 Citing the overwhelming
body of state law in conflict with the Court's decision, 4° the dissent proffered
that because Burbine was not informed of his attorney's telephone call, his
waiver was not constitutionally sound.41
This Note will provide an overview of the origins of the right to counsel,
its subsequent applicability to the custodial interrogation environment, and
judicial interpretation of the standard for waiver that has been delineated by
the Court. An analysis of Burbine will demonstrate that although the
Court's sixth amendment argument is amply supported by precedent, the
Court has jeopardized the "vital" role of counsel in the criminal justice sys-
tem by concluding that the fifth amendment does not prohibit the police
from interfering with attorney-client communications. Furthermore, this
tempted "to reach" Burbine, in actuality she neither requested to speak with nor to see her
client. See supra note 20.
39. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1166 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. A number of state courts have held that a suspect's statements cannot be used as
evidence when the police fail to inform the suspect of his attorney's defense efforts. See Weber
v. State, 457 A.2d 674 (Del. 1983) (attorney told he would not be permitted to consult with his
client unless the suspect asked for a lawyer); Haliburton v. State, 476 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 1985)
(lawyer, while present at police station, not permitted to speak with suspect), vacated and
remanded, 106 S. Ct. 1432 (1986); People v. Smith, 93 Il1. 2d 179, 442 N.E.2d 1325 (1982)
(police misinformed attorney that her client was undergoing drug withdrawal and was there-
fore unavailable for consultation), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 937 (1983); State v. Matthews, 408 So.
2d 1274 (La. 1982) (lawyer told over the telephone that the interrogation of his client would
not be interrupted despite his request); State v. Jackson, 303 So. 2d 734 (La. 1974) (suspect not
informed defense counsel had been retained by her family and was available for assistance);
Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 490 A.2d 1228 (1985) (attorneys, retained by suspect's
mother, denied access to client upon their arrival at police station), vacated and remanded, 106
S. Ct. 1452 (1986); Elfadl v. State, 61 Md. App. 32, 485 A.2d 275, cert. denied, 303 Md. 42,
491 A.2d 1197 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1457 (1986) (after a telephone request to speak
with the suspect was denied, lawyer arrived at police station but was again denied opportunity
to consult with suspect); Commonwealth v. Sherman, 389 Mass. 287, 450 N.E.2d 566 (1983)
(despite counsel's request to be present during questioning of her client, police failed to inform
her of the location and time of the interrogation); Commonwealth v. McKenna, 355 Mass.
313, 244 N.E.2d 560 (1969) (police directed attorney to the wrong city when he requested to
consult with his client); Lewis v. State, 695 P.2d 528 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984) (lawyer retained
by suspect's parents misdirected to several locations while in search of his client); State v.
Haynes, 288 Or. 59, 602 P.2d 272 (1979) (police transported suspect to another location to
frustrate counsel's attempts to see his client), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 945 (1980); Dunn v. State,
696 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc) (police refused to permit counsel to consult
with client and refused to give suspect counsel's business card), cert. denied. 106 S. Ct. 1478
(1986); State v. Jones, 19 Wash. App. 850, 578 P.2d 71 (1978) (lawyer contacted police by
telephone and requested that they refrain from interrogating the suspect in his absence). See
also Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1151 & n. 10 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for the American
Bar Association asAmicus Curiae at 4 n.2, Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986) (No. 84-
1485)).
41. See Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1157 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1986]
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Note will assert that, although Burbine suggests that in some instances delib-
erate police deception may rise to a denial of fundamental fairness, the
Court's dictum under the fourteenth amendment is ambiguous, and there-
fore provides insufficient guidance to the lower courts. Since state courts are
frequently confronted by situations in which the police have either directly
or deceptively refused to grant an attorney's request to consult with a client,
this Note will conclude by exploring the most sound alternative available to
states seeking to protect attorney-client communications in the wake of
Burbine.
I. ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND ITS APPLICABILITY TO
THE CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION SETTING
A. The Explicit Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
The right to counsel is explicitly granted by the sixth amendment.4 2 At
trial, the guarantee is necessary to assist the accused when he is confronted
by an intricate judicial proceeding that poses a threat to his life or liberty.4 3
The right would be of little consequence, however, if it did not also afford
the accused protection during critical pretrial events that carry sufficient ad-
versarial weight to shape the outcome of the final judgment. 4 Mindful of
this need, the sixth amendment right to counsel has been extended "back-
wards"4 5 by the Court since its early declaration in Powell v. Alabama4 6 that
"the guiding hand of counsel" is necessary to protect the accused "at every
step in the proceedings against him.",
47
Today, the sixth amendment is interpreted to guarantee the assistance of
counsel at or after the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings against the
accused.4" Thus, the right extends not only to trial49 and to the adversary
42. For a summarization of the history of the right to counsel, see Historical Argument,
supra note 8, at 1018-34.
43. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938) (stating that "the average defend-
ant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal
with power to take his life or liberty").
44. See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961) ("What happens [at arraignment]
may affect the whole trial. Available defenses may be ... irretrievably lost, if not then and
there asserted .... ").
45. See Kamisar, supra note 15, at 83 ("The Court has extended the sixth amendment
right to counsel . . . backwards from the trial through the indictment to the initiation of judi-
cial proceedings .... ").
46. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
47. Id. at 69.
48. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984); see Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387, 398 (1977); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972). In Kirby. the Court noted that the
initiation of adversary judicial proceedings signifies that "the government has committed itself
to prosecute." Id. at 689. The Court explained that "[i]t is then that a defendant finds himself
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judicial proceedings themselves,5" but also to any critical "extrajudicial"
proceedings5 conducted after the government has committed itself to prose-
cute.52 Massiah v. United States5 3 marked the Court's initial application of
the sixth amendment right to counsel to the extrajudicial interrogation pro-
cess. 54 The Court, in Massiah, held that the government's surreptitious and
deliberate elicitation 5 of incriminating statements from the accused, who
was free on bail after indictment, 56 amounted to a sixth amendment
violation."s
faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of
substantive and procedural criminal law." Id. The Court has recognized adversarial judicial
proceedings as "formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment."
Id.
49. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938).
50. See, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970) (Alabama preliminary hearing
is a critical stage at which the accused is entitled to the assistance of counsel); White v. Mary-
land, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (Maryland preliminary hearing is a critical stage); Hamilton v.
Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961) (Alabama arraignment is a critical stage).
51. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964) (citing Spano v. New York, 360
U.S. 315, 326 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967) (sixth amendment guar-
antees right to counsel at post-indictment lineup); Massiah, 377 U.S. at 205-06 (sixth amend-
ment guarantees right to counsel at post-indictment surreptitious interrogation). But see
United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973) (sixth amendment does not guarantee the
assistance of counsel at post-indictment photographic display); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S.
263, 267 (1967) (taking of handwriting exemplar is not a critical stage requiring the presence of
counsel). See generally Comment, The Right to Counsel Attachment Before Criminal Judicial
Proceedings 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 810 (1979).
53. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
54. See id. at 205-06.
55. See id. In Massiah, a co-defendant cooperated with the government and allowed its
agents to install a transmitter in his automobile. Id. at 202-03. When Massiah met with the
informant in the automobile, the government used the transmitter to listen to the conversation.
Id. at 203. Massiah made several incriminating remarks which were later used by the govern-
ment to secure his conviction. Id.
56. Id. at 201.
57. Id. at 205-06. Massiah's "deliberate elicitation" test was reaffirmed in United States v.
Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270-71 (1980), and Maine v. Moulton, 106 S. Ct. 477, 489 (1985). In
Henry, the Court held that the government's intentional use of a jail plant created a situation
likely to induce incriminating statements from the already indicted accused in the absence of
counsel. Henry, 447 U.S. at 266, 274. Although the informant did not question Henry di-
rectly, he served as a catalyst for the elicitation of incriminating statements by engaging in
conversation with the accused. Id. at 271. See generally Note, Sixth Amendment-Massiah
Revitalized, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 601 (1980); Note, United States v. Henry: The
Further Expansion of the Criminal Defendant's Right to Counsel During Interrogations, 8 PEP-
PERDINE L. REV. 451 (1981). In Moulton, the police obtained incriminating statements from
the accused, who had previously been indicted and released on bail, by equipping an accom-
plice with a body wire transmitter. Moulton, 106 S. Ct. at 480-82. Relying on Massiah, the
Court held that by "knowingly circumventing" Moulton's right to the assistance of counsel
during an adversarial confrontation between the accused and the state, the police violated his
sixth amendment right. See id. at 489-90. Whether the use of an informant who acts only as a
1986]
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This principle was extended to prohibit indirect interrogation tactics in
Brewer v. Williams."8  In Williams, the police employed an emotional
"Christian burial speech" to persuade the accused to lead them to the body
of the victim.59 Finding Williams "constitutionally indistinguishable"'
from Massiah, the Court held that the sixth amendment right to counsel was
violated when the police elicited incriminating statements from the accused
in the absence of counsel.6 ' The Court emphasized that although Williams
had expressly and implicitly asserted his right to counsel,62 the police made
no effort prior to the delivery of the burial speech to determine whether the
accused wished to execute a waiver. 63 Relying on the waiver standard for
constitutional rights set in Johnson v. Zerbst, 6' the Court held that the state
failed to prove that Williams intentionally relinquished a known right to
counsel before responding to the police.65
"listening post" violates the sixth amendment right to counsel was left unresolved in Moulton
and Henry. See Moulton, 106 S. Ct. at 488 n.13; Henry, 447 U.S. at 271 n.9. The Court
provided a negative response to this question in 1986 in Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. 2616,
2628 (1986). Emphasizing that Massiah's primary concern was eradicating surreptitious con-
duct that is the functional equivalent of direct police interrogation, the Court held that the use
of an informant who does not take affirmative action to elicit incriminating statements from
the accused is not violative of the sixth amendment right to counsel. See id. at 2630.
58. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
59. Id. at 392-93. Williams, who had escaped from a mental institution, was arrested and
arraigned for the murder of a ten-year-old girl. Id. at 390-91. He was advised of his Miranda
rights by the police and the arraigning judge. Id. The Miranda warnings were repeated
shortly before two detectives escorted Williams by police car to another city. Id. at 391. Addi-
tionally, Williams' counsel made an agreement with the police that the accused would not be
interrogated during the trip. Id. at 392. At some point during the ride, however, one of the
detectives who knew Williams was religious delivered the "Christian burial speech." Id. at
392-93. In essence, the detective requested Williams to direct the police to the body of the
victim so that she could be given a Christian burial before a snowstorm made discovery of the
body impossible. Id. Although the detective stated that he did not want an answer from
Williams, but only wanted him to "think about it," Williams eventually directed the police to
the body. Id. at 393.
60. Id. at 400.
61. Id. at 401, 405. See generally Kamisar, supra note 15 (discussing why Williams was
analyzed under the sixth amendment rather than under the fifth amendment).
62. The Court held that Williams made an express invocation of the right to counsel when
he stated he would speak to the police after he had the opportunity to consult with his lawyer.
See Williams, 430 U.S. at 405. The Court also held that Williams had impliedly asserted his
right to counsel by having secured counsel who, "acting as his agents," instructed the police
not to interrogate their client while he was being transported. See id.
63. Id.
64. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). The Court noted that "[a] waiver [of a fundamental right] is
ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Id. at
464.
65. Williams, 430 U.S. at 405. The Court carefully limited its ruling by stating in dictum
that Williams could have waived his sixth amendment right to counsel without notice to his
attorneys. See id. at 404-05. However, the Court failed to state whether a waiver of Miranda
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Surprisingly, it was not until 1986, in Michigan v. Jackson,6 6 that the
Court finally had the opportunity to apply a sixth amendment analysis 67 to a
situation involving direct police interrogation rather than the surreptitious
or indirect types of conduct present in Massiah and Williams. 68 In Jackson,
the two defendants were questioned by the police after their separate ar-
raignments. 69 The Court determined that since adversary judicial proceed-
ings had been initiated against both of the accused, the right to counsel was
applicable to their custodial interrogations by way of the sixth amendment
as well as the fifth amendment.7" Jackson established that the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel affords at least as much protection as the fifth amend-
ment right.7 ' It remains undetermined, however, whether a higher standard
of review accrues once the sixth amendment has attached.7 2
warnings alone would have been sufficient to establish a valid waiver of the sixth amendment
right to counsel. The Second Circuit has consistently held that a waiver of Miranda warnings
is not sufficient to establish a valid waiver of the sixth amendment right to counsel. See, e.g.,
United States v. Smith, 778 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Brown, 699 F.2d 585 (2d
Cir. 1983); United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1980); Carvey v. LeFevre, 611
F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 921 (1980); United States v. Massimo, 432 F.2d
324, 327 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1022 (1970). See generally
Costantino, Cannavo & Goldstein, supra note 5; Note, Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel.
Standards for Knowing and Intelligent Pretrial Waivers, 60 B.U.L. REV. 738 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter Standards for Pretrial Waivers]; Note, Proposed Requirements for Waiver of the Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (1982). Other circuits have held that
the sixth amendment right to counsel can be relinquished through a waiver of Miranda warn-
ings alone. See, e.g., United States v. Karr, 742 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1984); Tinsley v. Purvis,
731 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Woods, 613 F.2d 629 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 920 (1980); Blasingame v. Estelle, 604 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1979).
66. 106 S. Ct. 1404 (1986).
67. Id. at 1407-08.
68. The Court also applied a sixth amendment analysis to a case involving direct police
interrogation in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). However, in that case, adversary
judicial proceedings had not yet been initiated against the suspect and the Court has since
expressly disavowed its reliance on the sixth amendment. See infra notes 82-83 and accompa-
nying text.
69. Jackson, 106 S. Ct. at 1406-07.
70. Id. at 1407.
71. In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981), the Court held that once a suspect
invokes the fifth amendment right to counsel, a valid waiver cannot be established if the police
reinitiate questioning before an attorney is provided. See infra note 150. In Jackson, the Court
concluded that "the assertion [for counsel] is no less significant, and the need for additional
safeguards no less clear, when the request for counsel is made at an arraignment and when the
basis for the claim is the Sixth Amendment." Jackson, 106 S. Ct. at 1411.
72. See supra note 65 (discussing circuit courts' waiver standards under the fifth and sixth
amendments). In Burbine, the majority suggested in dictum that the sixth amendment right to
counsel does provide an accused with greater protection than the fifth amendment Miranda
right to counsel, at least as far as attorney-client communications are concerned. See Moran v.
Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1145 (1986) ("[W]e readily agree that once the [sixth amendment]
right has attached, it follows that the police may not interfere with the efforts of a defendant's
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B. Escobedo v. Illinois: Transcending the Right to Counsel into the
Investigatory Context
In Escobedo v. Illinois,73 an anomaly74 in the right to counsel case law, the
Court applied a sixth amendment analysis to find a constitutional violation
where adversary judicial proceedings had not been initiated against the sus-
pect.75 Prior to his formal indictment,76 Escobedo was interrogated and,
after repeated requests to consult with his attorney, he was told by the police
"that his lawyer 'didn't want to see him.' "7 In actuality, while Escobedo
was being questioned, his attorney was at the station persistently attempting
to consult with his client, but being prevented from doing so by the police.7"
The Court, finding that "it would exalt form over substance" to distinguish
between custodial interrogation conducted before or after formal indict-
ment,79 held that when an "investigation is no longer a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect,"' that
suspect has a right to counsel under the sixth amendment."'
The Court subsequently has limited Escobedo to its facts 2 and has ex-
pressly disavowed its reliance on the sixth amendment.8 3 The decision is
significant, however, because it emphasized that the importance of a sus-
pect's need for assistance of counsel during custodial interrogation should
not be dependent on the formal stage of the judicial proceedings against
attorney to act as a 'medium between [the suspect] and the State' during the interrogation."
(citations omitted) (emphasis in original)).
73. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
74. Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859, 939
(1979).
75. See Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 485; see also Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).
76. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 485.
77. Id. at 481.
78. Id. at 480-81.
79. Id. at 486. The Court also noted:
The right to counsel would indeed be hollow if it began at a period when few confes-
sions were obtained. There is necessarily a direct relationship between the impor-
tance of a stage to the police in their quest for a confession and the criticalness of that
stage to the accused in his need for legal advice.
Id. at 488.
80. Id. at 490. In Miranda, the Court explained that what it had meant in Escobedo by
"an investigation which had focused on an accused" is "questioning initiated by law enforce-
ment officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 & n.4 (1966); see also
infra note 94.
81. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490-91.
82. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 438 (1974); see Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689
(1972) (citing Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733-34 (1966)).
83. See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 n.5 (1984).
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him.84 Furthermore, the Court noted that our system of justice should not
"fear" communication between a suspect and his attorney because it might
encourage the suspect to invoke a constitutional right.8 5 These assertions
created a bridge for the Court to cross in Miranda v. Arizona16 when it ex-
amined the right to counsel within the fifth amendment context.
C. Miranda's Implicit Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel
While the Miranda Court claimed to adhere to the principle of Esco-
bedo, 7 the case was founded on a wholly different constitutional principle."8
Unlike Escobedo's sixth amendment analysis, 9 Miranda found the right to
counsel implicit in the context of the fifth amendment privilege against com-
pelled self-incrimination.9" Although not a constitutional right in itself,9
Miranda's right to counsel is a safeguard to insure that a suspect's fifth
amendment right "to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered
throughout the interrogation process.",92 The right is, in effect, an equalizer
designed to combat the inherent coerciveness 93 of police-dominated
questioning.
94
84. The Court noted that "[i]t would exalt form over substance to make the right to coun-
sel.., depend on whether at the time of the interrogation, the authorities had secured a formal
indictment." Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 486.
85. The Court stated:
No system worth preserving should have to fear that if an accused is permitted to
consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise, these rights. If the
exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a system of law en-
forcement, then there is something very wrong with that system.
Id. at 490 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
86. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
87. Id. at 444.
88. See Note, Standards for Pretrial Waivers, supra note 65, at 743.
89. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
90. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469.
91. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) ("The prophylactic Miranda
warnings ... are 'not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead meas-
ures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected.' " (quoting
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974))); see also Kamisar, supra note 15, at 61 (sug-
gesting that the fifth amendment right to counsel "has no life it can call its own").
92. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469.
93. See id. at 467.
94. See id. at 457. The right applies not only when an individual is interrogated by law
enforcement officials when in custody at the police station, but also when he is questioned
while "deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. at 477. Compare Orozco
v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 327 (1969) (questioning of a suspect in his bedroom held equivalent to
interrogation because the individual was not free to leave) and Mathis v. United States, 391
U.S. 1, 4-5 (1968) (holding Miranda applicable where suspect was questioned by Internal Rev-
enue Service agents while imprisoned for a separate offense) with Berkemer v. McCarty, 468
U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (finding "noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops" negates necessity
for Miranda warnings) and Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494-95 (1977) (finding no
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To insure that the principles of Miranda were carried out of the court-
room and into the interrogation room, 95 the Court required the authorities
to adhere to specific measures. 96 Most familiar is the required delivery of
Miranda warnings97 which includes informing a suspect of his right to have
counsel present during police questioning.98 The Court noted that an attor-
ney "plays a vital role in the administration of criminal justice"99 and should
not be considered a "menace"" to the police because he or she might advise
the suspect not to make a statement or might request to be present during
the interrogation.'10 Hence, should the right to counsel be invoked, the re-
quest must be fully honored by the authorities regardless of whether it will
affect the ability of the police to obtain a confession."12 However, the Mi-
randa Court held that failure to request affirmatively the assistance of an
attorney does not in itself constitute a waiver and, therefore, does not leave a
suspect unprotected. 10 3
II. THE MIRANDA WAIVER: CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
Once it has been ascertained that an individual subjected to custodial in-
terrogation was properly advised of his Miranda rights, a prerequisite to the
establishment of an effective waiver of counsel,"° the inquiry becomes two-
custodial interrogation where the suspect went voluntarily to the police station and was imme-
diately informed that he was not under arrest) and Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341,
342-47 (1976) (holding Miranda inapplicable where Internal Revenue Service agents ques-
tioned an individual at his private residence while he was not in custody).
95. See Comment, Knowledge of Counsel's Efforts to Contact Suspect Not Required for
Knowing Waiver of Fifth Amendment Rights-State v. Burbine, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 313,
315 (1983).
96. Although the Court delineated a specific procedure for the authorities to follow, it
also invited the states to design alternative, equally effective measures. See Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 444.
97. See supra note 24.
98. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471.
99. Id. at 481; see also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979) ("[The lawyer occu-
pies a critical position in our legal system because of his unique ability to protect the Fifth
Amendment rights of a client undergoing custodial interrogation.").
100. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 480.
101. Id. at 480-81 ("[The attorney] is merely carrying out what he is sworn to do under his
oath-to protect to the extent of his ability the rights of his client."); see also Escobedo, 378
U.S. at 490.
102. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467; see also Michael C, 442 U.S. at 719.
103. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470 ("An individual need not make a pre-interrogation re-
quest for a lawyer. While such request affirmatively secures his right to have one, his failure to
ask for a lawyer does not constitute a waiver.").
104. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468; see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 429 (1984).
However, there have been exceptions to Miranda's call for mandatory warnings. See Oregon
v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985) (failure to provide Miranda warnings prior to initial inter-
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tiered.' °5 First, a waiver must meet the traditional notion of voluntari-
ness.'° 6 Although Miranda's primary concern was directed at eradicating
the inherently compelling pressures of custodial questioning, the Court also
voiced continued concern over more flagrant and violative incommunicado
interrogation tactics used to secure confessions.'0 7 Evidence that a suspect
was subjected to lengthy or isolated interrogation or that the police used
threats or deception to obtain a statement indicates that the waiver was not
voluntarily made.' 8
In addition to reiterating the indispensability of voluntariness, the Mi-
randa Court held that a waiver must be knowingly and intelligently exe-
cuted.'0 9 This second-level inquiry originates from Johnson's sixth
amendment waiver standard" 0 and encompasses an evaluation of whether
the individual was sufficiently able to understand the right being relin-
quished and the consequences of waiver."' Because the state is responsible
for creating the insulated atmosphere of custodial interrogation, the Court
concluded that the government must shoulder the heavy burden of proving a
valid waiver." 2
rogation of a suspect does not require the exclusion of subsequent informed and voluntary
statements); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 651 (1984) (public safety considerations jus-
tify exception to required Miranda warnings); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445-46
(1974) (police questioning in absence of full Miranda warnings does not justify exclusion of
evidence derived from the interrogation); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971) (sus-
pect's statement may be used for impeachment purposes despite absence of complete Miranda
warnings). See generally Note, Oregon v. Elstad: Boldly Stepping Backwards to Pre-Miranda
Days, 35 CATH. U.L. REV. 245 (1985).
105. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981).
106. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
107. Id. at 445-48 & nn.6-7.
108. See id. at 476.
109. In addressing the requirements for waiver, the Court held:
Opportunity to exercise [the rights to silence and counsel] must be afforded to [a
suspect] throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and
such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive
these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. But unless and until
such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence
obtained as a result of the interrogation can be used against him.
Id. at 479 (footnote omitted); see also Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482 ("[W]aivers of counsel must
not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege .... ").
110. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
I 11. See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979) ("The question is not one of
form, but rather whether the defendant in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights
delineated in the Miranda case.").
112. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
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A. The Voluntariness Doctrine
The notion of voluntariness pre-dates Miranda 113 and, although incorpo-
rated into that decision's fifth amendment analysis,' 14 remains an independ-
ent constitutional source for scrutinizing the admissibility of a confession
under the fourteenth amendment." 15 Under our accusatorial system of jus-
tice, 116 due process requirements of fundamental fairness forbid the use of a
confession against a suspect when the statement was obtained through in-
quisitorial measures." 7 Additionally, fundamental fairness" 8 dictates that
the ultimate truth of a confession is irrelevant to a determination regarding
its admissibility into evidence." 9 The Supreme Court has deemed this nec-
essary to preserve the ideals of decency and fairness 120 "implicit in the con-
113. See Miller v. Fenton, 106 S. Ct. 445, 449 (1985) ("This Court has long held that
certain interrogation techniques, either in isolation or as applied to the unique characteristics
of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be con-
demned under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
114. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
115. See Miller, 106 S. Ct. at 449 ("[E]ven after holding that the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against compulsory self-incrimination applies in the context of custodial interrogations...
the Court has continued to measure confessions against the requirements of Due Process."
(citations omitted)).
116. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961). The Court stated that "the meth-
ods used to extract [involuntary confessions] offend an underlying principle in the enforcement
of our criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system." Id.
117. See Miller, 106 S. Ct. at 453. In Miller, the Court stated that
the admissibility of a confession turns as much on whether the techniques for ex-
tracting the statements, as applied to this suspect, are compatible with a system that
presumes innocence and assures that a conviction will not be secured by inquisitorial
means as on whether the defendant's will was in fact overborne.
Id. (emphasis in original).
118. The due process guarantee of fundamental fairness has been applied by the Court in
other contexts. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Greenfield, 106 S. Ct. 634, 641 (1986) (use of postar-
rest, post-Miranda warnings silence as evidence of sanity deemed fundamentally unfair);
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672-73 (1983) (revocation of defendant's probation, who
through no fault of his own could not pay a fine, held contrary to the principle of fundamental
fairness); Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 487 n.14 (1978) (refusal to give petitioner's re-
quested instruction on presumption of innocence violative of due process guarantee of funda-
mental fairness); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976) (use of postarrest, post-Miranda
warnings silence to impeach testimony at trial is fundamentally unfair); Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (prosecution's suppression of evidence favorable to an accused, despite
accused's request, violates due process where the evidence may affect guilt or punishment).
But see South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 565 (1983) (use of refusal to take a blood-
alcohol test as evidence of guilt is not fundamentally unfair); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S.
231, 238-39 (1980) (use of prearrest silence for impeachment purposes is not an abridgement of
fundamental fairness).
119. See Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941); see also Rogers v. Richmond, 365
U.S. 534, 541 (1961).
120. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) ("Regard for the requirements of
the Due Process Clause 'inescapably imposes upon this Court an exercise of judgment upon
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cept of ordered liberty." 2 '
The principle that interrogation tactics must not result in a denial of due
process was advanced as early as 1936 in Brown v. Mississippi. 122 In Brown,
the police hanged and beat the defendants until confessions were com-
pelled. "'23 Finding such tactics "revolting to the sense of justice," the Court
held the resulting inculpatory statements inadmissible under the fourteenth
amendment. 124 Brown was followed by a long line of cases in which the
Court held state interrogation practices to be violative of due process.' 25
the whole course of proceedings ... in order to ascertain whether they offend those canons of
decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples.
(quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416-17 (1945))).
121. See id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
122. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
123. Id. at 281-83.
124. Id. at 286.
125. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (suspect interrogated while barely con-
scious in hospital intensive care unit despite his repeated requests for counsel); Darwin v.
Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346 (1968) (per curiam) (police attempted to employ a hypnotic device
during incommunicado interrogation); Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967) (per curiam)
(suspect ordered to confess while the chief of police held a loaded gun to his head); Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (suspect held in lengthy incommunicado detention and told
he would only be allowed to call his wife if he confessed); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293
(1963) (police inadvertently administered truth serum-like drug to suspect who was ill);
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961) (suspect's wife asked by the police to confront
her husband and urge him to confess); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960) (suspect
was insane at the time he confessed); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (false emotional
ploy used to elicit confession); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (suspect told that 30-40
people outside of the jail "wanted to get" him and if he confessed the police would protect
him); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957) (petitioner of extremely low intelligence kept in
isolation for five days while his lawyer and father were prevented from seeing him); Leyra v.
Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954) (the "doctor" that police obtained to treat suspect's sinus condi-
tion was actually a psychiatrist trained in hypnosis); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68
(1949) (police threatened to arrest petitioner's mother to obtain a confession); Turner v. Penn-
sylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949) (suspect held incommunicado for five days of persistent question-
ing); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) (petitioner held in solitary confinement for five days
of persistent questioning); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (fifteen-year-old suspect ques-
tioned for five hours in the middle of the night by numerous police officers in the absence of
counsel or friends); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945) (prosecutor stated at trial that
suspect, who was held incommunicado and questioned while naked, "was not too hard to
break"); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (suspect held incommunicado without
sleep or rest for 36 hours); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942) (suspect continuously moved to
strange towns, told of threats of mob violence, and persistently questioned); White v. Texas,
310 U.S. 530 (1940) (suspect taken from jail and interrogated in the woods at night); Chambers
v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (questioning of suspects over the course of five days culminated
in an all-night interrogation session). In other cases, however, the Court has held confessions
to be voluntary. See Ashdown v. Utah, 357 U.S. 426 (1958) (suspect's father and uncle denied
permission to consult with her); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (illiterate suspect was
held for 18 days before preliminary hearing and appointment of counsel); Stroble v. California,
343 U.S. 181 (1952) (interrogation occurred in the presence of 19 state authorities and attorney
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What emerged from these decisions was a totality of circumstances ap-
proach 126 under which, "by way of convenient shorthand," the Court as-
sessed the voluntariness of each confession. 127 However, due to the Court's
case-by-case examination, vague guidelines rather than bright line rules cir-
cumscribe the voluntariness doctrine's application to new fact patterns. 128
One certainty that does exist under the voluntariness doctrine is that the
range of inquiry under the totality of circumstance approach must be broad
enough to encompass mental as well as physical coercion. 129 Darwin v. Con-
necticut 130 provides an example of the Court's application of due process
standards to a situation void of physically abusive interrogation tactics, yet
still questionable under traditional notions of justice.131 The suspect in Dar-
win was arrested on a murder charge.13 2 He was then subjected to intensive
questioning by the police which included the attempted use of a hypnotic
device. 133 Darwin's requests to communicate with the outside world were
denied on three occasions. 3' The following day, after continued interroga-
was denied access to suspect); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951) (suspect subjected to
uncomfortable jail accommodations, limited food rations, and threats).
126. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942). In holding that due process is tested
under the totality of circumstances surrounding a particular case, the Court in Betts noted that
facts "which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the
universal sense of justice, may, in other circumstances, and in the light of other considerations,
fall short of such denial." Id. (citation omitted); see also Culombe, 367 U.S. at 601 ("No single
litmus-paper test for constitutionally impermissible interrogation has been evolved.").
127. See Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 206-07.
128. See Graham, supra note 4, at 161. Several commentators have criticized the use of the
voluntariness doctrine and principles of fundamental fairness to adjudge interrogation methods
due to the vagueness of the totality of circumstances approach. See Historical Argument, supra
note 8, at 1013-14 ("A case decided by the standard of fundamental fairness has limited value
as precedent since it provides only vague principles to guide those who must enforce the stan-
dard."). See generally Schulhofer, Book Review, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865 (1981) (reviewing Y.
KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY
(1980)) (summarizing criticism of the voluntariness test expressed by Kamisar and other com-
mentators); Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New"
Fifth Amendment and the "Old" Voluntariness Test, 65 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1966) (criticizing
the Miranda dissenters' "extravagant faith" in the voluntariness test). But see Grano, supra
note 74, at 944 ("While some of the criticism [regarding the voluntariness doctrine] correctly
pointed to the need for more analytic certainty, most of it went too far in calling for the
abandonment of this doctrine altogether.").
129. See Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 206 (citing Fikes, 352 U.S. at 197); see also Leyra, 347 U.S.
at 558.
130. 391 U.S. 346 (1968) (per curiam).
131. See id. at 349.
132. Id. at 347. Darwin requested to make a telephone call upon his arrest, but was denied
an opportunity to do so. Id. at 347 n.1.
133. Id. at 347.
134. Id. at 349.
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tion, Darwin confessed to the crime.13  Throughout the course of the in-
communicado questioning, Darwin's lawyers made numerous attempts to
communicate with their client by telephone and in person. 136 These efforts
proved unsuccessful due to police interference, which included repeated dis-
claimers of knowledge of where Darwin was located. 137 The Court con-
cluded that under the totality of these circumstances, Darwin's confession
was not voluntary.
1 31
The Court recently had occasion to review the voluntariness doctrine in
Miller v. Fenton. 139 During custodial interrogation, the police suggested to
Miller, who was arrested for murder,"4 that he would not be punished if he
confessed because it was apparent that whoever committed the crime "had a
'mental problem' and needed medical help."'' The Court indicated that a
finding of voluntariness, in addition to turning on whether the suspect's will
was overborne,' 42 is also based on preserving a system of justice "that
presumes innocence and assures that a conviction will not be secured by
inquisitorial means. "143 Although acknowledging that the usefulness of the
135. Id. at 347. Shortly before confessing, Darwin appeared to faint. After being revived,
he issued his statement to the police. Id.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 347-48. Even after counsel obtained a writ of habeas corpus, the police still
failed to produce the suspect until he was brought to court the following day. Id. at 348.
138. Id. at 349. One of the factors the Court considered in assessing the totality of circum-
stances surrounding Darwin's confession was the denial of access to counsel made by the po-
lice. Id. But see Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 197-98 (1952) (prosecutor's refusal to
interrupt interrogation to admit counsel, who had previously consulted with the suspect, held
not to be a violation of due process). The Court in Stroble noted that "[w]hile district attor-
neys should always honor a request of counsel for an interview with a client," there was no
showing of prejudice from the denial under the facts of the case. Id. at 198. The inconsistent
results in Darwin and Stroble, particularly the degree of emphasis the Court placed on counsel
being denied access to a suspect in each case, demonstrates the unpredictability of the volunta-
riness doctrine. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
139. 106 S. Ct. 445 (1985). The ultimate issue in Miller was whether the voluntariness of a
confession is a finding of fact entitled to a presumption of correctness. Id. at 447. The Court
concluded that the voluntariness of a confession is a legal inquiry requiring independent fed-
eral review. Id. at 451-52. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings con-
sistent with the Court's holding. Id. at 454. On remand, the court of appeals held Miller's
confession to be voluntary. Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1986).
140. Miller, 106 S. Ct. at 447. The victim was a seventeen-year-old woman who was found
mutilated in a stream near her home. Id.
141. Id. at 448. In addition, the police falsely informed Miller that he had been identified
at the scene of the murder and that his blood stains had been found there. Id. The police also
told Miller that the victim was still alive and able to identify the person who attacked her even
though they knew this was a false statement. Id. Later, they informed Miller that the victim
"had just died." Id. The interrogation session lasted less than one hour. After confessing,
Miller lapsed into a "state of shock." Id.
142. Id. at 453.
143. Id.
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voluntariness doctrine has been questioned by several commentators,144 the
Court nevertheless reemphasized that interrogation procedures must remain
faithful to the fourteenth amendment's due process guarantee of fundamen-
tal fairness. 1
45
B. State Interpretation of Miranda's Knowing
and Intelligent Requirement
A valid waiver of the fifth amendment right to counsel must not only be
voluntary, but must also be "a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege."' 46 As found under the volun-
tariness doctrine,' 47 a totality of the circumstances approach is used to ex-
amine the validity of a waiver under the knowing and intelligent standard.' 48
Factors that have been held to influence the ability of an individual to make
a valid waiver under this standard include "the background, experience, and
conduct of the accused." 49 The Court, however, has offered little indication
of how these, as well as other, circumstances should or should not bear on
this evaluation.'5 ° Thus, prior to Burbine, when state courts were required
144. Id. at 453 n.4 ("The voluntariness rubric has been variously condemned as 'useless,'
S.. 'perplexing,' . . . and 'legal double-talk' .... (citations omitted)).
145. See id. at 449.
146. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981) (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
464 (1938)); see supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482.
149. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-75 (1979) (quoting Johnson, 304
U.S. at 464).
150. See Note, Totality of the Circumstances: A Guideline for Waiver of Miranda Rights?
North Carolina v. Butler, 51 U. COLo. L. REV. 247, 250 & n.26 (1980). The clearest rule
pertaining to waiver was established in Edwards, 451 U.S. at 477. Edwards held that once the
right to counsel has been invoked, a waiver is per se invalid unless the suspect is given the
opportunity to consult with counsel or he initiates further communication with the police. Id.
at 484-85. Thus, even if an individual is readvised of his Miranda rights after invoking his
right to counsel and executes an express waiver, statements resulting from police-initiated in-
terrogation are still inadmissible as evidence. Id. In addition, even if the suspect is responsible
for initiating communication with the police after invoking the right to counsel, thereby negat-
ing the applicability of the Edwards bright line rule, an inquiry still has to be made as to
whether the waiver was knowing and intelligent under the totality of circumstances. Id. at
485-86. For example, in Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1046 (1983) (plurality opinion)
the Court found that the suspect initiated communication with the police after invoking his
right to counsel. Thus, the Edwards per se rule was inapplicable and the remaining inquiry
was whether Bradshaw's waiver was knowingly and intelligently made. Id. at 1046. Factors
that influenced the Court's determination that Bradshaw had executed a valid waiver were the
absence of coercion from the interrogation environment, proper administration and compre-
hension of Miranda warnings, and Bradshaw's unprovoked decision to change his mind about
his previous request to consult with counsel. Id. at 1045-46.
Few of the Court's decisions have examined the validity of a Miranda waiver where the right
to counsel was never invoked by the suspect. Even those cases that have addressed the issue
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to resolve a situation where the police interfered with communications be-
tween an attorney and client prior to or during interrogation, they were left
to their own interpretational devices. Three divergent views have emerged.
1. The Liberal New York Rule
Although urged to do so by amici, the Miranda Court did not go as far as
requiring the actual presence of counsel during custodial interrogation as a
prerequisite to the establishment of a valid fifth amendment waiver.''
Nothing in the Miranda decision, however, was meant to prevent the states
from formulating more protective safeguards than those delineated. 152
Therefore, relying on its own state constitution and statutory provisions,' 53
New York has extended its protections beyond those guaranteed by the fed-
eral Constitution in what has become known as the Donovan-Arthur-Hobson
rule. 15
4
In People v. Donovan, 155 decided several years prior to Miranda, a murder
confession was obtained during a period of interrogation throughout which
have provided little direction. In Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 44 (1982) (per curiam), the
defendant voluntarily requested a polygraph examination. Prior to the test, he was informed
of his rights and executed a written waiver. Id. at 44. After the examination concluded, Fields
agreed to discuss the results with the authorities. Id. at 44-45. Miranda warnings were admin-
istered again, and Fields incriminated himself. Id. at 45. The Court remanded for a determi-
nation of whether the totality of circumstances indicated that Fields made a knowing and
intelligent waiver. Id. at 48-49.
In Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724 (1979), the Court held that a juvenile's request to
see his probation officer was not an invocation of the right to counsel. The validity of the
juvenile's waiver was then examined under the knowing and intelligent standard. Id. at 724.
In light of the care the police took in insuring that the suspect understood his rights, the
express willingness of the suspect to waive his rights after his request to see his probation
officer was denied and he was readvised of his rights, and the suspect's considerable experience
with the law through prior arrests, the Court upheld the juvenile court's determination that a
valid waiver had been executed. Id. at 726.
In Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 650-51 (1984), the Court held that Edwards should not be
applied retroactively, but declined to rule on whether the suspect's waiver met the knowing
and intelligent standard. Id. at 651. The case was remanded for that determination. Id.
151. See Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1144 (citing Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as
Amicus Curiae at 22-31, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (No. 759)); see also Mi-
randa, 384 U.S. at 475 ("An express statement that the individual is willing to make a state-
ment and does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a
waiver.").
152. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. The Court stated: "Our decision in no way creates a
constitutional straitjacket which will handicap sound efforts at reform. . . . We encourage
Congress and the States to continue their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of
protecting the rights of the individual . I..." Id.
153. See People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 151, 193 N.E.2d 628, 629, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841,
843 (1963).
154. See State v. Burbine, 451 A.2d 22, 28 (R.I. 1982).
155. 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963).
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counsel was denied access to the suspect.'5 6 Finding the responsibility to
protect individual rights weightier than the need for effective police interro-
gation tactics,"' the Court of Appeals of New York held that if either a
suspect or his retained attorney is denied a request to consult with the other,
a violation of fundamental fairness and the effective assistance of counsel
results.' 5 ' In People v. Arthur, 159 the court refined its standard by holding
that once an attorney enters a proceeding, a valid waiver of the right to
counsel can only be executed by the suspect while the attorney is present. 6 °
People v. Hobson 161 reaffirmed this rule, holding that it "breathes life into
the requirement that a waiver of a constitutional right must be competent,
intelligent and voluntary."'' 62
2. The Prevalent State View
The majority of other state courts that have ruled on the issue have also
held that the failure of the police to inform a suspect of his attorney's efforts
to contact him vitiates any possibility of a valid waiver.' 63 Declining to
adopt the more extreme position of the New York rule, however, these
156. Id. at 150-51, 193 N.E.2d at 629, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
157. See id. at 152, 193 N.E.2d at 630, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 844.
158. Id. at 153, 193 N.E.2d at 630, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 844-45. The Donovan violation was
based on provisions in the New York State Constitution pertaining to the right to counsel, the
privilege against self-incrimination, and the guarantee of due process. See id. at 151, 193
N.E.2d at 629, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
159. 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968).
160. Id. at 329, 239 N.E.2d at 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 666 ("There is no requirement that the
attorney or defendant request the police to respect this right .... "). In People v. Pinzon, 44
N.Y.2d 458, 464, 377 N.E.2d 721, 725, 406 N.Y.S.2d 268, 271 (1978), the court afforded
further protection to attorney-client communications by placing the burden on the police to
keep track of a suspect in custody. Thus, in Pinzon, an attorney's telephone call to the main
switchboard at the police station and his request that no further questioning take place was
enough to place the police on notice that counsel had appeared on behalf of the suspect. Id. In
People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226, 229-31, 205 N.E.2d 852, 854, 257 N.Y.S.2d 924, 926-28
(1965), the court went as far as barring all inculpatory statements made by the defendant while
he was under arrest in California after his retained attorney, who was located in New York,
telephoned the New York police and told them that he did not want any statements taken
from the suspect. The court concluded that "where a person is represented by counsel,
whether or not the police may question him in the absence of his attorney should not turn on
whether the latter presents himself at the place where his client is in physical custody and
expressly requests the opportunity to consult with him." Id. at 231-32, 205 N.E.2d at 855, 257
N.Y.S.2d at 928.
161. 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976).
162. Id. at 484, 348 N.E.2d at 898, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 422. The New York rule has been
adopted in Pennsylvania. See Commonwealth v. Hilliard, 471 Pa. 318, 322, 370 A.2d 322, 324
(1977) ("lf counsel has expressed a desire to be present during interrogation, a waiver of coun-
sel obtained in counsel's absence should be held invalid as a matter of law.").
163. See supra note 40.
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courts have reached a consensus that while police interference with attorney-
client communication'" 4 may result in a constitutional violation, the absence
of counsel from the interrogation room does not fatally taint a waiver, 65
These states require the police, at a minimum, to inform a suspect of his
lawyer's availability. 166 Once the suspect is properly armed with this infor-
mation, he may then choose to accept or reject his attorney's assistance. 67
If he declines to consult with counsel, statements obtained during subse-
quent questioning may be used against him. 168
There are variations, however, even among this consensus. For example,
in State v. Jones 169 the Court of Appeals of Washington held that a suspect
must be informed of counsel's telephonic request that the police refrain from
164. In some instances, the police not only failed to inform the suspect of counsel's availa-
bility, but also deliberately prevented the attorney from consulting with the suspect through
deceptive ploys. See People v. Smith, 93 Ill. 2d 179, 183, 442 N.E.2d 1325, 1326-27 (1982)
(attorney incorrectly told "she could not see her client because he was undergoing heroin
withdrawal"), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 937 (1983); Commonwealth v. McKenna, 355 Mass. 313,
319-20, 244 N.E.2d 560, 563-64 (1969) (while the suspect was under interrogation in Revere,
Massachusetts, the police directed his attorney to Boston); Lewis v. State, 695 P.2d 528, 531
(Okla. Crim. App. 1984) ("compelling circumstantial evidence" suggested that attorney was
purposefully kept from his client by being sent to various locations in the jail and courthouse);
State v. Haynes, 288 Or. 59, 63, 602 P.2d 272, 274 (1979) (when counsel arrived at the jail to
consult with his client, the police moved the suspect to another location), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
945 (1980).
165. See, e.g., Weber v. State, 457 A.2d 674, 686 (Del. 1983) ("[T]he rule we adopt and the
New York rule are distinct, and we specifically decline to adopt the latter."); Lodowski v.
State, 302 Md. 691, 721, 490 A.2d 1228, 1243 (1985) ("Other cases... have adopted an even
more stringent rule-once an attorney enters the proceeding, the police may not question the
defendant in the absence of counsel unless there is an affirmative waiver, in the presence of the
attorney.., we do not subscribe to that rule." (citations omitted) (emphasis in original)), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 1469 (1986).
166. See, e.g., Haliburton v. State, 476 So. 2d 192, 194 (Fla. 1985) ("In order for the right
to counsel to be meaningful, a defendant must be told when an attorney who has been retained
on his behalf is trying to advise him."), vacated and remanded, 106 S. Ct. 1452 (1986); Smith,
93 Ill. 2d at 189, 442 N.E.2d at 1329 ("[W]hen police ... refuse an attorney ... access to the
suspect, there can be no knowing waiver of the right to counsel if the suspect has not been
informed that the attorney was present and seeking to consult with him."); Haynes, 288 Or. at
73-74, 602 P.2d at 278-79 ("[W]hen law enforcement officers have failed to admit counsel to a
person in custody or to inform the person of the attorney's efforts to reach him, they cannot
thereafter rely on defendant's 'waiver' for the use of his subsequent uncounseled statements or
resulting evidence against him.").
167. See, e.g., Weber, 457 A.2d at 686 ("[A]fter being fully informed of the presence of
counsel, a suspect may knowingly and intelligently waive his rights without consulting his
attorney."); Haliburton, 476 So. 2d at 194 ("If the defendant wishes to reject the opportunity
for such advice, he may do so. The determination of the need for counsel is defendant's pre-
rogative."); State v. Jones, 19 Wash. App. 850, 853, 578 P.2d 71, 73 (1978) ("A defendant may
... choose to disavow his counsel's demand that counsel be present during interrogation.").
168. See, e.g., Haynes, 288 Or. at 70, 602 P.2d at 277.
169. 19 Wash. App. 850, 578 P.2d 71 (1978).
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interrogating the suspect in his absence.' 7 ° Similarly, in Commonwealth v.
Sherman '' the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a sus-
pect must be informed of his attorney's request to be present during ques-
tioning.172 In State v. Haynes17 3 the Supreme Court of Oregon limited its
holding by requiring the police to inform a suspect of counsel's availability
only when the lawyer is available and attempting to consult with his or her
client. 174 Whether a telephone call to the police renders an attorney "avail-
able" under Haynes is uncertain. A number of other state courts have re-
solved this ambiguity by ruling that an attorney must actually be present at
the site of the interrogation before the police will be required to inform a
suspect of counsel's availability.'
7 1
Despite these distinctions, the general premise behind the prevalent state
view is that the abstract offer of counsel provided in the Miranda warnings
differs substantially from an opportunity to consult with "an identified attor-
ney actually available to provide at least initial assistance and advice."1 76 A
suspect who declines the former offer might react differently to the latter. 1
77
Thus, the majority of state courts have concluded that information regarding
counsel's availability is essential to a knowing and intelligent Miranda
waiver. 178 In addition to relying on this interpretation of Miranda to pro-
hibit interference with attorney-client communications, a few states have
170. Id. at 851, 853, 578 P.2d at 72-73.
171. 389 Mass. 287, 450 N.E.2d 566 (1983).
172. Id. at 294, 450 N.E.2d at 570; see also Commonwealth v. McKenna, 355 Mass. 313,
324, 244 N.E.2d 560, 566 (1969).
173. 288 Or. 59, 602 P.2d 272 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 945 (1980).
174. Id. at 70, 602 P.2d at 277.
175. See State v. Weber, 457 A.2d 674, 686 (Del. 1983) ("To effectively invoke this rule,
the attorney must present himself at the police station or other site of interrogation .... );
Haliburton v. State, 476 So. 2d 192, 194 (Fla. 1985) ("The police do not have to obey a tele-
phone order of an attorney to cease questioning a defendant .... Our holding turns on the
fact that the attorney . . . was in the station house requesting to speak with appellant."),
vacated and remanded, 106 S. Ct. 1452 (1986); Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 721, 490 A.2d
1228, 1243 (1985) ("[A] suspect must be fully informed of the actual presence and availability
of counsel who seeks to confer with him."), vacated and remanded, 106 S. Ct. 1452 (1986).
176. Haynes, 288 Or. at 72, 602 P.2d at 277.
177. Id., 602 P.2d at 277.
178. See, e.g., Weber, 457 A.2d at 685-86 ("To allow the police to use tactics which prevent
or forestall a suspect from exercising his rights is inconsistent with the clear purpose of Mi-
randa .... Furthermore, the use of such tactics is logically incongruous with the concept of a
knowing and intelligent waiver .... " (citations omitted)); People v. Smith, 93 111. 2d 169. 185-
86, 442 N.E.2d 1325, 1328 (1982) ("Here we consider that there was not a knowing and intelli-
gent waiver of the right to counsel during the interrogation in view of the interference with [the
attorney's] effort to consult with the defendant."), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 937 (1983). In Lewis
v. State, 695 P.2d 528 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984), the court concluded:
It is one thing to say a lawyer has no right to see a client; it is quite another to say
that an accused person knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel and
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also utilized their own constitutions and laws to require the police to inform
a suspect of his attorney's defense efforts. 179
3. The Strict Miranda Construction
A minority of states have declined to adopt the view expressed by the
majority of jurisdictions and have narrowly interpreted the Miranda deci-
sion. The Supreme Court of Georgia in Blanks v. State '80 criticized the lib-
eral New York rule, as well as the prevalent state position for providing an
unwarranted advantage to the suspect who, through financial and other re-
sources, is swiftly able to retain counsel.' 8 ' Finding a rule based on how
quickly counsel appears at the interrogation site or how quickly he
"'spring[s] to the telephone' " to be irrational, the court concluded that the
fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination is a personal
right that cannot be invoked by counsel or other third parties. '82 A similar
position was expressed by the Supreme Court of Iowa in State v. Blanford. 183
In Blanford, the court reasoned that "a suspect's request for counsel must be
honored; a lawyer's request for a client need not be."' 18
4
his right against selfincrimination [sic] when it was not made known to him that his
lawyer was, in effect, knocking at the jail house door.
Id. at 530.
179. See, e.g., Lewis, 695 P.2d at 531; Haynes, 288 Or. at 71-74, 602 P.2d at 278-79; Dunn
v. State, 696 S.W.2d 561, 569-70 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
1478 (1986). In State v. Matthews, 408 So. 2d 1274, 1277 (La. 1982), the Supreme Court of
Louisiana relied entirely upon its state constitution and statutory policy to prohibit the author-
ities from interfering with attorney-client communications. The court held that, in accordance
with state policy, Louisiana "welcome[s] and encourage[s] an attorney to confer with his client
in order that he may intelligently exercise his rights during interrogation." Id. at 1278 (foot-
note and citation omitted).
180. 254 Ga. 420, 330 S.E.2d 575 (1985).
181. Id. at 423, 330 S.E.2d at 579 (citing Kamisar, supra note 15, at 95).
182. Id. (citing State v. Burbine, 451 A.2d 22, 28 (R.I. 1982); see also State v. Beck, 687
S.W.2d 155, 158 & n.7 (Mo. 1985) (en banc) ("Appellant's constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination is a personal one and is a right that cannot be exercised by third parties." (cita-
tions omitted)).
183. 306 N.W.2d 93 (Iowa 1981).
184. Id. at 96. The court reasoned: "We may differ as to whether the police should have
told defendant of [counsel's] call. The question, however, is whether they were obliged to do
so. We find no basis for saying they were." Id. (emphasis in original). The court's holding
ignores the standards for post-custodial procedure proposed by the American Law Institute
and the American Bar Association. See CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE
§ 140.7(1) (Official Draft 1975) ("An attorney undertaking to act as counsel for an arrested
person shall have prompt access to such person, by telephone, and in person on counsel's
arrival at any place where such person is detained"); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 5-
5.1 & commentary (2d ed. 1980 & Supp. 1986) (proposing that counsel should be provided to a
suspect "as soon as feasible after custody begins"); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 5-7.1
& commentary (2d ed. 1980 & Supp. 1986) (proposing that the authorities should affirmatively
assume the responsibility of placing a suspect in communication with a lawyer).
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These cases represent the strictest state construction of Miranda. Accord-
ing to this view, a suspect's ability to make a knowing and intelligent fifth
amendment waiver cannot be influenced by the failure of the police to dis-
close information about his attorney's availability."8 5 Although a minority
position, the interpretation received constitutional approval in Burbine. 186
III. MORAN v BURBINE: THE DECLINE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL'S
"VITAL" ROLE IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
It is undisputed under Miranda that when a suspect asks to consult with
an attorney prior to or during custodial interrogation, the police must scru-
pulously honor the request."' Moran v. Burbine'88 presented the Court
with a variation of this scenario by necessitating a determination of the obli-
gations of the police when an attorney attempts to reach a client who is
being held in custody.' 89 Burbine contended that under the federal Consti-
tution the police must inform a suspect of counsel's defense efforts in his
behalf and must be forthright in their dealings with the suspect's attorney. 190
Furthermore, he asserted that by deliberately misleading attorney Munson
and failing to inform him of her telephone call19' the Cranston police vio-
lated his rights under the fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments. 192
A. The Majority Opinion: Defense Counsel as a "Handicap" to Effective
Law Enforcement
Burbine contended that the police violated his sixth amendment right to
counsel by interfering with the attorney-client relationship that had been es-
tablished between him and Munson.' 93 The Court was unpersuaded. After
185. See Blanks, 254 Ga. at 423, 330 S.E.2d at 579; Beck, 687 S.W.2d at 159.
186. See Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1141 ("Events occurring outside of the presence of the
suspect and entirely unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the capacity to compre-
hend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right.").
187. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981). In Edwards, the Court held that
when a suspect exercises the fifth amendment right to counsel, the police must honor the
request by ceasing all questioning until an attorney is made available or the suspect reinitiates
communication about the investigation. Id.
188. 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986).
189. Although Munson did not request to speak with or to see her client, the Court
phrased the issue as if she had attempted to "reach" Burbine. See supra note 38.
190. See Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1143.
191. The police told Munson that they would not be questioning her client, but then pro-
ceeded to interrogate Burbine less than an hour after the phone call terminated. See supra
notes 20, 23, and accompanying text.
192. See Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1141, 1145, 1147.
193. See id. at 1145. While Burbine conceded that the formal sixth amendment right to
counsel attaches only after the filing of a formal charge, he contended that the sixth amend-
ment "protects the integrity of the attorney-client relationship regardless of whether the prose-
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discrediting Burbine's reliance on Escobedo and Miranda as support for his
sixth amendment argument,' 94 the Court rejected the assertion that the sixth
amendment right to counsel can be "triggered" by the formation of the at-
torney-client relationship. 9 ' Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor
emphasized that the attachment of a constitutional right is not a matter of
happenstance, as it would be if it were dependent on whether a suspect had
fortuitously retained counsel prior to questioning by the police.' 96 Justice
O'Connor reiterated that the Court's unyielding precedent has established
that the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches only after adversary judi-
cial proceedings' 97 have been initiated against the accused.'98 The Court
concluded that since the government's focus in Burbine was investigatory
rather than accusatory,' 99 the sixth amendment challenge was "practically
and theoretically unsound." 2"
The majority also rejected Burbine's assertion that information regarding
attorney Munson's telephone call was essential to his ability to execute a
cution has in fact commenced." Id. (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court of Rhode Island
determined that under state law an attorney-client relationship did not exist between Burbine
and Munson. State v. Burbine, 451 A.2d 22, 29 (R.I. 1982). When the case reached the
Supreme Court of the United States, the state conceded that an attorney-client relationship
had existed and invited the Court to address the issue. See Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1145 n.3.
The Court, however, did not decide the sixth amendment issue because of the state's conces-
sion; instead, its reason for responding to Burbine's argument was that it focused on constitu-
tional principles under the particular facts of his case rather than on whether an attorney-
client relationship existed under state law. See id.
194. See Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1145-46. The majority noted that "the 'prime purpose' of
Escobedo was not to vindicate the constitutional right to counsel as such, but, like Miranda, 'to
guarantee full effectuation of the privilege against self-incrimination.' " See id. at 1146 (quot-
ing Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)).
195. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1146.
196. See id.
197. Adversary judicial proceedings have been defined by the Court as "formal charge,
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682, 689 (1972); see also supra note 48 and accompanying text.
198. See Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1146.
199. See id. at 1147.
200. See id. at 1146. The majority noted that in Maine v. Moulton, 106 S. Ct. 477, 488-89
(1985), the surreptitious conduct of the police elicited incriminating statements pertaining to
two separate offenses; Moulton had been indicted for one offense, but not the other. While the
Court excluded evidence regarding the crime for which Moulton had been indicted, it held that
statements made concerning the other charge would be admissible at a separate trial for only
that charge. See Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1146; see also supra note 57. The Burbine majority
rationalized that "because Moulton already had legal representation, the decision all but fore-
closes (Burbine's] argument that the attorney-client relationship itself triggers the Sixth
Amendment right." Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1146. The Court did note in dictum, however, that
"once the [sixth amendment] right has attached, . . . the police may not interfere" with the
attorney-client relationship. Id. at 1145 (emphasis added); see also supra note 72.
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valid fifth amendment waiver.2"' Although Justice O'Connor acknowledged
that such information might have been "useful" to Burbine,20 2 she reasoned
that it would be "incongruous" to hinge a suspect's ability to knowingly and
intelligently waive his rights on events that are completely unknown to
him.2 °3 Under the majority's analysis, once it was ascertained that the po-
lice did not coerce Burbine's confession, 2° and that Burbine was fully ap-
prised of his Miranda rights and understood the consequences of issuing a
statement, 20 5 his waiver was valid "as a matter of law. ' 206
The Court refused to extend Miranda to require the police to inform a
suspect of his lawyer's communications.20 7 Justice O'Connor stated that
while the adoption of such a rule "might add marginally" 20 to diminishing
the inherent coercion of the custodial interrogation environment, 20 9 it would
also serve to "handicap" the investigative duties of the police by discourag-
ing the suspect from issuing a statement.21 0 Concluding that this would
come at a substantial cost to society's long-recognized need for interrogation
as an effective law enforcement tool,2 11 the Court struck the balance against
201. See Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1141.
202. Id. at 1142. The Court noted that such information might have affected Burbine's
decision to confess. Id.
203. See id. at 1141-42. According to the Court, "the same defendant, armed with the
same information and confronted with precisely the same police conduct, would have know-
ingly waived his Miranda rights had a lawyer not telephoned the police." Id. at 1142.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1143.
208. Id. The Court stated that "a rule requiring the police to inform the suspect of an
attorney's efforts to contact him would contribute to the protection of the Fifth Amendment
privilege only incidentally, if at all." Id. at 1144.
209. See id. at 1143-44.
210. See id. at 1144. Justice O'Connor noted that "the very premise of the Court of Ap-
peals was not that awareness of Ms. Munson's phone call would have dissipated the coercion
of the interrogation room, but that it might have convinced respondent not to speak at all."
Id. The majority also expressed concern that the adoption of a rule requiring the police to
inform a suspect of counsel's availability "would have the inevitable consequence of muddying
Miranda's otherwise relatively clear waters." Id. at 1143. The Court provided a list of ques-
tions the rule would "spawn" regarding the obligations of the police. See id.; see also Brown-
ing, supra note 15, at 61. Browning summarized the possible confusion a "telephone rule"
would create:
The minute a voice on the telephone claims to be that of a lawyer ... the police will
have to stop what they're doing to answer these questions: Is this person really a
lawyer? Does this lawyer have a legitimate, "professionally" ethical interest in the
suspect? Has the lawyer expressed that interest properly or has the offer of assistance
been so half-hearted that the courts will consider it no offer at all?
Id.
211. See Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1144. According to Justice O'Connor, "[a]dmissions of
guilt are more than merely 'desirable,' . . . they are essential to society's compelling interest in
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society's competing concern for the protection of individual liberties.212 Jus-
tice O'Connor recognized that the Court's holding conflicts with the preva-
lent state interpretation of Miranda.213 She emphasized, however, that the
Court's duty to interpret the Constitution cannot defer to "the numerical
preponderance" of state decisions.214
The Court perfunctorily rejected Burbine's fourteenth amendment argu-
ment that the deception of his attorney deprived him of the due process
guarantee of fundamental fairness.2 15 Justice O'Connor stated that the con-
duct of the Cranston police did not "shock[] the sensibilities of civilized soci-
ety '2t6  as to justify federal encroachment of the state's criminal
procedure.2 7 The Court did note in dictum, however, that under "more
egregious" circumstances than those surrounding Munson's telephone call
to the Cranston police, police deception might result in a denial of funda-
mental fairness.21 8
B. The Dissenting Opinion: The "Cost" of "Lawyer-Free" Interrogation
In a dissenting opinion Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, criticized the majority's conclusion that police interference with
attorney-client communications does not violate the Constitution.2" 9 Ac-
cording to the dissent, this holding ignores the accusatorial nature of our
finding, convicting and punishing those who violate the law." Id. (citation omitted). But see
Historical Argument, supra note 8, at 1048-51 (arguing that the presence of counsel during
interrogation is not a complete impediment to the prosecution).
212. See Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1144.
213. See id. The view expressed by a majority of state courts is that a suspect must be
informed of his attorney's defense efforts in order to execute a knowing and intelligent fifth
amendment waiver. See supra notes 163-79 and accompanying text.
214. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1144. The Court also refused to adopt the legal profession's
suggested standards for proper treatment of a suspect held in custody. Id. ("[Our interpretive
duties go well beyond deferring ... to the subconstitutional recommendations of even so es-
teemed a body as the American Bar Association."). The American Bar Association Standards
for Criminal Justice recommend that the police affirmatively assume the responsibility of plac-
ing a suspect in communication with a lawyer "as soon as feasible after custody begins." See
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 5-5.1 & commentary (2d ed. 1980 & Supp. 1986); STAN-
DARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 5-7.1 & commentary (2d ed. 1980 & Supp. 1986); see also
supra note 184. Thus, despite its acknowledgment of a "distaste" for the deliberate deception
of an attorney and the "reckless" withholding of information from a suspect, the Court found
no basis under the fifth amendment for regulating this type of conduct. See Burbine, 106 S. Ct.
at 1142-43.
215. See Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1147-48.
216. See id. at 1148.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 1147.
219. See id. at 1150 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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criminal justice system 2° as well as the Court's deep-rooted abhorrence of
incommunicado questioning. 221 Dismayed by the Court's approval of "law-
yer-free, incommunicado custodial interrogation,, 222 Justice Stevens viewed
the Court's opinion as sanctioning "police deception of the shabbiest
kind.
, 223
Justice Stevens failed to make a direct response to the majority's sixth
amendment analysis. Finding the existence of Burbine's right to counsel un-
questionable under the fifth amendment, 224 the dissent found no significance
in whether the sixth amendment right to counsel was also applicable. 225 Ac-
cording to Justice Stevens, the pertinent issue was whether the deception of
attorney Munson was "utterly irrelevant" to Burbine's right to counsel, re-
gardless of whether the source of that right was the fifth or sixth amend-
ment. 226 The dissent then utilized agency law principles 227 to hold that the
deception of Burbine's attorney was equivalent to the deception of
Burbine,228 and therefore violated his "undisputed" right to counsel under
the fifth amendment.229
In addressing Burbine's waiver challenge, Justice Stevens reminded the
Court that under Miranda the government, not the suspect, bears the burden
of proving a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of the fifth amendment
privilege.23° Justice Stevens suggested that this strict presumption 231 was
especially relevant in Burbine where, through no fault of the suspect, it was
difficult to ascertain what actually transpired during the interrogation due to
a lack of "disinterested witnesses., 232 The dissent proffered that a suspect's
knowledge of the availability of an identified attorney differs substantially
220. See id. at 1148 (citing Miller v. Fenton, 106 S. Ct. 445, 449 (1985)).
221. Seeid. at 1150.
222. See id.
223. Id. at 1151.
224. See id. at 1163 &n.51.
225. See id. at 1163.
226. See id..
227. Id..
228. Id. Justice Stevens relied on Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), in his applica-
tion of agency principles. See Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1163 n.49 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In
Williams, the Court held that counsel had asserted Williams' rights by acting as his agents.
See Williams, 430 U.S. at 405; see also supra note 62. However, in Williams the accused's sixth
amendment right to counsel had attached by way of arraignment. Williams, 430 U.S. at 391.
Hence, Justice Stevens' reliance on Williams is questionable since adversary judicial proceed-
ings had not been initiated against Burbine at the time of his interrogation.
229. See Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1163 n.49 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 1157.
231. See id.
232. Id.
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from the abstract offer of counsel provided in the Miranda warnings.233 In
accordance with the prevalent state view, 234 Justice Stevens concluded that
information regarding the actual availability of counsel has a direct influence
on the right the suspect is being asked to relinquish.235
The dissent also criticized the Court's refusal to extend Miranda to re-
quire the police to inform a. suspect of his attorney's availability. 236 Dis-
missing the majority's balancing approach as "profoundly misguided,"
Justice Stevens stressed that the only "cost" of informing a suspect of his
lawyer's defense efforts is an increased probability that the suspect will exer-
cise his rights and a decreased probability that the police will obtain a con-
fession.2 37  The dissent noted that in Miranda the cost of less effective
interrogation practices did not justify allowing the police to question a sus-
pect without first informing him of his rights. 238 Applying this principle to
Burbine, Justice Stevens reasoned that the same cost should not justify the
deliberate withholding of information crucial to a suspect's waiver deci-
sion. 239 The dissent was clearly disturbed that the Court allowed "fear '24
of the invocation of rights to "tip[] the scales of justice." 24'
Justice Stevens also condemned the majority's fourteenth amendment
"shock the conscience test."' 24 2 He proposed that the due process guarantee
of fundamental fairness encompasses a broad evaluation of whether the re-
quirements of "fairness, integrity, and honor" have been afforded to an indi-
vidual in the administration of criminal justice. 243 Noting that the
voluntariness doctrine is often used as a "convenient shorthand"' 21 for re-
viewing a full range of questionable interrogation tactics under requirements
of fundamental fairness,245 the dissent reasoned that police interference with
attorney-client relations should also fall under the due process "rubric. 246
233. Id. at 1159-60 (quoting State v. Haynes, 288 Ore. 59, 72, 602 P.2d 272, 278 (1979)
(footnote omitted)).
234. See supra notes 163-79 and accompanying text.
235. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1159-60 & n.42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 1160.
237. See id.
238. See id. at 1161.
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. See id.
242. See id. at 1165 ("Finding its conscience troubled, but not shocked, the majority rejects
the due process challenge.").
243. See id.
244. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
245. See Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1165 & n.62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
246. See id. at 1165. The dissent saw no relevance to whether Burbine's sixth amendment
right to counsel had attached since Burbine's right to counsel had clearly become applicable
under the fifth amendment. See supra notes 227-29 and accompanying text. The dissent's
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The dissent held that by driving "a wedge" between Munson and Burbine
through the use of false information and the omission of critical information,
the conduct of the Cranston police had clearly violated Burbine's rights
under the fourteenth amendment.2 47
C. The Forgotten Role of Counsel
The Court's denial of Burbine's sixth amendment claim is clearly sup-
ported by precedent. The sixth amendment right to counsel has consistently
been held to attach only after the state's focus becomes adversarial.248 The
State of Rhode Island was acting in an investigative capacity at the time of
Burbine's interrogation.249 Burbine attempted to sidestep this fact by di-
recting the Court's attention to the integrity of the attorney-client relation-
ship rather than the stage of the proceedings against him.250 By refusing to
create an exception that would provide sixth amendment protection at the
formation of the attorney-client relationship, the Court has indicated that it
is not readily diverted from the "state focus" test.25'
While the Court was clearly warranted in relying on precedent to reject
Burbine's sixth amendment argument, it chose to ignore its own fifth amend-
ment teachings. In addressing the waiver issue, the majority refused to
adopt a rule that would require the police to inform a suspect of counsel's
availability. 252 The Court held that such a rule would "handicap" effective
law enforcement by discouraging confessions and encouraging a suspect to
approach ignores the distinction the Court has drawn between the explicit sixth amendment
right to counsel and the implicit fifth amendment right to counsel. But see Kamisar, supra
note 15, at 80-83 (discussing the arbitrariness of the attachment of the sixth amendment right
to counsel at the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings). Justice Stevens' failure to make
a direct response to the majority's sixth amendment analysis suggests that the dissent had no
basis for circumventing the Court's strong sixth amendment precedent.
247. See Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1166 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
248. See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387, 398-99 (1977); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).
249. Formal charges had not been filed against Burbine at the time of his interrogation.
See Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1145.
250. The only exception to this precedent is Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (dis-
cussed supra notes 73-85 and accompanying text). In Escobedo, the Court held that the sus-
pect's sixth amendment right to counsel was violated during his custodial interrogation even
though adversary judicial proceedings had not been initiated. See id. at 485. The Court has
subsequently limited Escobedo to its facts and criticized its reliance on sixth amendment prin-
ciples. See Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 188 n.5; Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 438 (1974); Kirby,
406 U.S. at 689; see also supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
251. See Kamisar, supra note 15, at 83 (hypothesizing that although the sixth amendment
right to counsel has been extended "backwards" from trial to the initiation of adversary judi-
cial proceedings, "the Court is unlikely to extend the right any further").
252. See supra notes 207-12 and accompanying text.
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invoke his rights to silence and counsel.253 As the dissent noted, this balanc-
ing approach is at odds with the Court's philosophy that an accusatorial
system of justice cannot be swayed by fear that an individual will exercise a
constitutional right. 254 Furthermore, while the majority refused to defer to
the "numerical preponderance" of state decisions,255 the Court failed to in-
dicate why an overwhelming number of state courts incorrectly concluded
that information regarding counsel's availability is essential to a suspect's
ability to make a knowing and intelligent fifth amendment waiver. 256 The
Court's failure to account for the rejection of the prevalent state interpreta-
tion of Miranda is questionable in a decision that has a direct bearing on
state criminal procedure.257
The majority's fifth amendment analysis is also disturbing because it ig-
nores what the Court has described as defense counsel's "vital role in the
administration of criminal justice. '25  In its result-oriented attempt to place
the need for confessions before the need for legal representation, the Court
did not hesitate to protect the ability of law enforcement authorities to exe-
cute their investigative duties. 2 9 It found no basis, however, under the fed-
eral Constitution for giving equal effect to the lawyer's "critical position in
our legal system ' 260 as a protector of individual rights.26' In effect, the
Court has sanctioned in Burbine what it had condemned the police from
doing in Miranda; it has labeled defense counsel a "menace" to interroga-
tion out of fear that the presence of a lawyer will encourage a suspect to
remain silent.
262
253. See id.
254. See Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1160-61 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 480-81; Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490.
255. See supra notes 163-79 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalent state interpre-
tation of Miranda).
256. See Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1159 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
257. See id.
258. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 481.
259. See Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1144.
260. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979).
261. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 480-81 ("[The attorney] is merely carrying out what he is
sworn to do under his oath-to protect to the extent of his ability the rights of his client.").
262. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 480; see also Brief of the American Bar Association as Ami-
cus Curiae at 4, Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986) (No. 84-1485) ("[T]he police ...
armed with a routine Miranda waiver of the abstract right to a lawyer, will be free to treat the
real lawyer as an uninvited intruder in the post-arrest interrogation process."); see also supra
note 15.
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IV. BEYOND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION: ATTORNEY-CLIENT
COMMUNICATIONS IN THE WAKE OF BURBINE
As Justice Stevens noted in his dissenting opinion, the scope of Burbine is
ominous.26 3 The decision suggests that the police may deny an attorney ac-
cess to a suspect with little risk of constitutional repercussions. 264 While the
Court noted that under "more egregious" facts than those presented in
Burbine, police deception may result in a violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment due process guarantee of fundamental fairness, 265 no indication was
given as to the type of conduct that might cause such an abridgement. Fur-
thermore, due to the ambiguous nature of the Court's dictum, it is unclear
whether the statement was made in reference to deception of a suspect or
deception of an attorney. If the Court's dictum was meant to prevent the
police from deceiving a suspect, it has merely restated prior voluntariness
principles in a confusing form, for the Court has frequently emphasized that
the police may not employ deception to trick a suspect into waiver. 266 How-
ever, if the Court's dictum was also made in reference to the deception of an
attorney, then a new dimension to fundamental fairness principles has been
announced.26 7
State courts may choose, when confronted by "egregious" cases in which
the police have deceived an attorney, to rely on the Court's fourteenth
amendment dictum, thereby protecting attorney-client communications
under notions of fundamental fairness. A consequence of this approach,
however, is that it requires an assessment of the totality of circumstances
surrounding each case to determine whether the particular type of deception
employed is or is not violative of the Constitution.268 Because state case law
indicates that the police frequently utilize a variety of deceptive ploys to
prevent an attorney from consulting with a suspect who is being held in
custody, 269 this approach would undoubtedly result in inconsistent state ju-
263. See Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1164 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
264. See id. Justice Stevens noted that, prior to Burbine, even the law enforcement profes-
sion believed that it could not deny an attorney's access to his or her client. Justice Stevens
stated that if there was no constitutional bar to refusing counsel access to a client, there would
be no need for the police to employ deceptive measures to avoid access, as exemplified in a
number of state decisions. See id. at 1164 & nn.55-56; see also supra note 164 (discussing state
decisions in which the police employed deception to prevent a consultation between counsel
and client).
265. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1147.
266. See Miller v. Fenton, 106 S. Ct. 445 (1985); see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476 ("[Alny
evidence that the accused was ... tricked ... into a waiver ... will, of course, show that the
defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege.").
267. See supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text (discussing the voluntariness doctrine).
268. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
269. See supra note 164.
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dicial determinations.27 ° A final consideration is that application of the
Court's dictum is likely to be subject to further constitutional scrutiny due to
the ambiguous nature of the Court's statement in Burbine. 
271
A more sound alternative is available to states seeking to protect attorney-
client communications in the wake of Burbine. As the Court noted, its deci-
sion does not prevent the states from adopting more exacting requirements
pertaining to the conduct of state authorities.272 The states of New York273
and Louisiana 274 have effectively utilized their own constitutions and statu-
tory policies to prevent police from interfering with an attorney's right to
consult with a client.275 If counsel is to remain an integral element in the
early stages of the criminal justice system, other states should follow the
examples set by these states and utilize their own constitutions and laws as
the basis for prohibiting the police from directly or deceptively denying an
attorney access to a suspect being held in custody.2
76
270. Commentators have criticized the usefulness of the fourteenth amendment voluntari-
ness doctrine and principles of fundamental fairness due to the vagueness of the totality of
circumstances approach. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. The inconsistency that
results from the totality of the circumstances approach is illustrated by comparing the Court's
conclusions in Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346 (1968) (per curiam) and Stroble v. Califor-
nia, 343 U.S. 181 (1952). See supra note 138 and accompanying text; see also supra note 125.
271. See supra notes 265-67 and accompanying text.
272. See Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1145; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. For a comparison
of how several states have broadened the right to counsel beyond the limitations imposed by
the sixth amendment of the federal Constitution, see Miller, Right to Counsel: State Courts on
the Front Line, 1984 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 179, 190-200.
273. See supra notes 153-62 (discussing New York's Donovan-Arthur-Hobson rule).
274. See State v. Matthews, 408 So. 2d 1274, 1277 (La. 1982).
275. Other states have relied in part on their own constitutions in reaching the conclusion
that a suspect cannot make a knowing intelligent waiver unless he is informed of his attorney's
defense efforts. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
276. The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice and the American Law
Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure provide useful guidelines for states
seeking to adopt statutory provisions to protect attorney-client communications. See supra
note 184. The adoption of such a statute would allow the state to create a clear set of rules
governing the conduct of police authorities as well as defense counsel. Thus, states that are
hesitant to make the police accountable for every telephone call that comes through the sta-
tion's main switchboard can institute laws that would only require accountability when defense
counsel is actually present at the interrogation site. See supra note 210 (discussing the poten-
tial confusion a "telephone rule" might create); see also supra notes 169-75 and accompanying
text (discussing various guidelines state courts have utilized in making the police accountable
for an attorney's request to consult with a client). Furthermore, a statutory provision does not
necessarily have to require the police to honor an attorney's request to consult with a suspect
being held in custody in order to protect attorney-client communications. The law need only
require the police to inform the suspect of counsel's availability; the suspect may then choose
to accept or reject the lawyer's assistance. Compare supra notes 155-62 and accompanying text
(discussing the New York rule) with notes 163-68 and accompanying text (discussing a poten-
tial alternative to the New York rule).
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V. CONCLUSION
In Moran v. Burbine, the Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment
does not protect the integrity of the attorney-client relationship prior to the
initiation of adversary judicial proceedings against the accused. The Court
also held that the fifth amendment does not require the police to inform a
suspect of counsel's availability as a prerequisite to a knowing and intelligent
Miranda waiver. While the Court's dictum under the fourteenth amend-
ment is ambiguous, it is clear that at least some types of deception of an
attorney are not violative of the due process guarantee of fundamental fair-
ness. The Court's conclusion in Burbine was based on the premise that soci-
ety's interest in utilizing interrogation to secure confessions outweighs its
interest in the protection of individual liberties.
In rejecting the fifth amendment as a basis for safeguarding counsel's abil-
ity to consult with a suspect held in custody, the Court has been swayed by
fear of the invocation of constitutional rights. Furthermore, the Court's fail-
ure to recognize the critical position of defense counsel as a protector of
individual rights demonstrates a retreat from the values inherent in an accu-
satorial system. Unless the states assume the responsibility of protecting at-
torney-client communications by relying on their own constitutions and
statutory provisions, Burbine may signify the decline of defense counsel's
vital role in the criminal justice system.
Laura Antonelli
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